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The  European  Community  is  stepping  tenta- 
tively  toward  a  European  Monetary  Union  (EMU) 
that  would  replace  most  of  Western  Europe’s  cur- 
rencies  with  a single money,  perhaps  called  the  Euro- 
pean  Currency  Unit  (ECU).  * No  previous  monetary 
union  ever  involved  such  a large portion  of the  world 
economy  or resulted  in the  disappearance  of so many 
major  trading  currencies.  Historical  evidence 
presented  here  suggests  that  a  durable  monetary 
union  requires  that  one  monetary  authority  control 
policy  for  the  entire  union  and  that  it have  sufficient 
power  to  enforce  the  agreement  on  the  member 
nations. 
For  non-Europeans,  transacting  business  with  en- 
tities  in a European  Monetary  Union  would  be  quite 
different  from  dealing  with  entities  in today’s  separate 
nations,  each  with  its  own  currency.  Furthermore, 
dealing  with  a  stable,  apparently  permanent  union 
would  be very  different  from  dealing  with  a precarious 
union  poised  to  break  apart  at the  seams.  A number 
of possible  effects  of an EMU  on the  world  economy 
have  been  expressed  by  its supporters,  including:  [ 11 
Giscard  d’Estaing  ( 19691~~ 17- 18) argued  for an EMU 
on the  grounds  that  its currency  would  rival the  dollar 
as  the  medium  of  international  exchange  and  thus 
capture  some  of  the  financial  rewards  of  issuing  a 
reserve  currency.  Johnson  (1973/pp95-96),  however, 
thought  the  dollar  was  too  entrenched  to  be  easily 
challenged;  [Z] Many  hope  an  EMU  will  increase 
European  (and  world)  output  [see  Cooper 
(1973/p252)  for  a contrary  view];  [3] An EMU  could 
lower  European  (and  world)  inflation  [see  Cohen 
(1981)  for  a  contrary  view]. 
In  a  monetary  union,  two  or  more  countries 
agree  to  a jointly  managed  monetary  policy.  Allen 
(1976/pp4-5)  lists  three  minimal  conditions  for  a 
monetary  union: 
r The  ECU  currently  exists  (defined  as  a weighted  basket  of 
European  currencies)  but  only  serves  as a unit  of account.  The 
ECU  described  in  this  paper  would  be  a  full-fledged  money, 
serving  also  as the  medium  of exchange  and  store  of value.  At 
this  writing,  West  Germany  and  East  Germany  have  just 
formed  a monetary  union  as a step  toward  political  reunification. 
One  effective currency: There  must  either  be 
a single  currency  or several  currencies,  fully  and  per- 
manently  convertible  into  one,another  at immutably 
fixed  exchange  rates  (say,  10 francs  = 1 pound),  thus 
acting  as  a  single  currency. 
One  effective exchange  rate:  There  can  be 
only  a single  exchange  rate  (and  thus,  one  exchange 
rate  policy)  between  the  union  currency  and  exter- 
nal currencies.  For  example,  if both  France  and  Ger- 
many  use  ECUs,  then  France  cannot  have  an  ex- 
change  rate  of  1 U.S.  dollar  per  ECU  while  Ger- 
many’s  rate  is  2  U.S.  dollars  per  ECU.  If they  did 
set  rates  in this  way,  free  convertibility  would  mean 
that  someone  could  make  limitless  profits  by paying 
France  1 dollar  for  an  ECU,  then  selling  the  ECU 
to  Germany  for  2  dollars,  then  using  the  2  dollars 
to buy  2 ECUs  from  France,  then  selling the  2 ECUs 
to  Germany  for  4  dollars,  and  so  on.  Eventually, 
either  the  exchange  rate  differential  would  evaporate, 
exchange  controls  would  have  to  be  imposed,  or 
France  would  run  out  of  ECUs. 
One  monetary  policy:  Nations  joining  a 
monetary  union  give  up  the  power  to  conduct  in- 
dependent  monetary  policies.  Monetary  policy  con- 
sists  of controlling  the  quantity  of money  (or at least 
its high-powered  component)  via open  market  opera- 
tions,  rediscounting,  reserve  requirements,  credit 
controls,  intervention  in foreign  exchange  markets, 
and  exchange  controls.  Under  an  independent 
monetary  policy  the  individual  country  decides  its 
rate  of inflation  by controlling  nominal  money  growth, 
nominal  interest  rate,  or  exchange  rates. 
I. 
HISTORY  OF  MONETARY  UNIONS 
Monetary  unions  appear  to have  existed  as far back 
as Ancient  Greece  and  certainly  existed  in medieval 
Europe  (Nielsen/1937/p.595).  This  section  examines 
historical  examples  of  monetary  unions,  paying 
special  attention  to  the  causes  that  led  to  a union’s 
demise. 
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Colonial  New  England: Until  around  1750,  a 
monetary  union  existed  in the  New  England  colonies 
(Lester/1939/pp7-8).  The  paper  money  of each  of 
the  four  colonies  (Connecticut,  Massachusetts  Bay, 
New  Hampshire,  and  Rhode  Island)  was  accepted 
as legal tender  by the  others,  even  for taxpayments. 
The  union  lasted  nearly  a century  and  relied  on  the 
economic  dominance  of  Massachusetts,  whose 
monetary  policy was foollowed  in lockstep  by the other 
colonies.  The  three  smaller  colonies  eventually  grew 
to challenge  Massachusetts’s  economic  primacy  (see 
population  data  in HSUS/1975/p1168)  and  began  to 
overissue.  currency  in  the  1730s  and  1740s 
(McCusker/l978/ppl3  l-35).  Regional  monetary 
cooperation  deteriorated,  and in 175 1, Massachusetts 
redeemed  its  paper  money,  resumed  a silver  stan- 
dard,  and  ceased  accepting  the  other  colonies’  paper 
money. 
Latin  Monetary  Union3  In  the  mid-1860s 
France,  Belgium,  Switzerland,  Italy,  and  Greece 
formed  the  Latin  Monetary  Union,  considered  by 
some  to  be  the  first  international  effort  to  regulate 
exchange  rates  (Wisely119771pSl).  Member  coun- 
tries  could  mint  unlimited  quantities  of certain  gold 
and  silver  union  coins,  all of which  were  legal tender 
across  the  union.  Each  country  could  mint  limited 
quantities  of smaller-denomination  (subsidiary)  silver 
coins,  but  these  were  legal  tender  only  in the  indi- 
vidual  issuing  country.  Subsidiary  coins  had  a lower 
silver content  than  the union  coins.  Despite  the coins’ 
lower  intrinsic  value,  public  offices  in  one  country 
were  required  to accept  up to  100 francs  in the  other 
countries’  subsidiary  coins  on individual  transactions, 
a  loophole  that  helped  destroy  the  union. 
The  union  money  supply  was  to  be  determined 
by  the  market.  The  central  banks  promised  to 
freely  exchange  gold  and  silver  for  coins.  This 
bimetallic  standard  soon  began  to  strain  the  union 
by  forcing  the  central  banks  to  guarantee  that  the 
ratio  of gold  to  silver  prices  (per  unit  weight)  would 
remain  fixed.  But, the relative values of gold and silver 
were  determined  in  world  markets,  and  the  Latin 
Union  was  too  small  to  determine  world  prices. 
The  union  overvalued  silver  which  the  members  at- 
tempted  to  force  on  each  other,  eventually  forcing 
the  suspension  of silver  convertibility  and  a move  to 
a  de facto  gold  standard.  Outstanding  silver  coins 
remained  legal  tender,  and  subsidiary  coins  were 
treated  virtually  as  legal  tender. 
2 Much  of the  technical  and  chronological  detail  of this  section 
comes  from  Nielsen  (1937/pp596-98). 
At  this  point,  the  subsidiary  coins  became  the 
union’s  principal  problem.  Their  intrinsic  value  was 
less  than  their  face  value,  and  the  union  members 
went  back  and  forth  in repealing  and  reenacting  the 
legal  tender  status  of  specific  countries’  subsidiary 
coins  (Nielsen/1937/p597).  World  War  I  created 
enormous  financing  needs,  and some  members  intro- 
duced  paper  standards  and  began  depreciating  their 
currencies.  Despite  theoretical  limitations  on  the 
production  and movement  of subsidiary  coins,  these 
low-value  pieces  were  overissued  and  continually 
flowed  into  whichever  country  had  the  least 
depreciated  money.  Finally,  in  late  1920,  the 
members  began  refusing  to  accept  not  only  each 
others’  subsidiary  coins,  but  also  the  overvalued 
silver  union  coins.  The  Latin  Union  ceased  to  exist 
as  a practical  matter,  though  it  continued  in  name 
until  the  late  1920s.  The  Latin  Union  was  said  to 
have  “decreed  one  common  currency  without 
setting  up  a common  monetary  policy  (Fratiani  and 
Spinelli/1984).”  Alternatively,  the  Latin  Union  can 
be  said to have  decreed  a common  monetary  policy 
but  left  each  national  central  bank  to police  its  own 
compliance. 
Scandinavian Monetary Union:  In the  1870s 
Sweden,  Denmark,  and  Norway  formed  the 
Scandinavian  Monetary  Union  under  which,  like the 
Latin  Union,  gold  coins  of each  country  circulated 
freely  as  legal  tender  in  all  three  countries  (see 
Lester/  1939/pp  176-8 1).  Subsidiary  coins  also  cir- 
culated  across  borders  as  legal  tender,  and  by 
1900,  banks  in  all  these  countries  also  accepted 
each  member  country’s  banknotes  at  par 
(Nielsen/1937/p598).  By  190.5, the  union  was  con- 
sidered  so  complete  that  exchange  rates  ceased 
being  quoted. 
As  long  as  limited  stocks  of  gold  restrained  the 
production  of money,  the  union  worked  well.  In the 
end,  though,  World  War  I financing  needs  led many 
countries  to  inflate  their  currencies  and  dump  gold 
at  the  same  time  Scandinavia  was  maintaining  a 
fixed  Krone  gold  price.  The  depreciated  currencies 
were  then  used  to  purchase  gold  at  official  (cheap) 
rates;  the  gold  was then  exchanged  for Scandinavian 
currency,  which  was  less  depreciated  than  that  of 
other  countries.  Scandinavia  was  required  by  the 
union  agreement  to  issue  currency  to  buy  the  gold 
flowing  in,  thus  causing  the  Scandinavian  money 
supplies  to rise with  world  inflation.  Eventually,  the 
countries  losing  gold  were  forced  off the  gold  stan- 
dard,  but  not  early  enough  to  prevent  inflation  in 
Scandinavia. 
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exempt  the  central  bank  and  mint  from  their 
obligation  to  purchase  gold  at  a  fixed  price 
(Lester/  19391~~ 17587),  a policy  recommended  by 
Knut  Wicksell  and  Gustav  Cassel.  For  a  time, 
Denmark  and  Norway  believed  themselves  exempt 
from  Sweden’s  gold  embargo  and,  because  their  cur- 
rencies  were  more  depreciated  than  Sweden’s,  they 
began  shipping  gold  to  Sweden  as  the  rest  of  the 
world  had  done  previously.  In  1917,  Sweden  pro- 
hibited  unlimited  gold  shipments  from  the  other 
union  members,  largely  eliminating  the  purpose  of 
the  union. 
Gold  convertibility  placed  a limit  on Scandinavian 
money  supply  growth  (though  the  limit became  unac- 
ceptably  high  once  other  countries  began  leaving  the 
gold  standard).  Without  convertibility,  the  only  con- 
trol  on  money  issuance  was  the  resolve  of the  cen- 
tral  banks,  and  this  proved  to be  weak.  All member 
countries’  subsidiary  coins  were  still  legal  tender 
across  the  union,  so  Denmark  and  Norway  began 
shipping  large  quantities  of  these  small  coins  to 
Sweden,  just  as  the  Latin  Union  members  had 
shipped  to whichever  member  had the  strongest  cur- 
rency  at a given  time.  Finally,  in  1924,  shipment  of 
subsidiary  coins  was  prohibited,  effectively  ter- 
minating  the  union. 
East African  Currency  Area:  Under  British 
colonial administration,  monetary  policy was generally 
carried  out  by a nrrrenq  board,  an agency  that  stood 
ready  to change  the  colonial  currency  for foreign  cur- 
rency,  and  Sterling  in particular.  Under  such  an  ar- 
rangement,  in  1922,  British  East  Africa  (Kenya, 
Uganda,  and  Tanganyika,  plus  Zanzibar  in  1936) 
adopted  a common  currency,  the  East  African  shil- 
ling (Pick/1971/pp257,566,586).  After independence 
East  Africa  remained  part  of the  Sterling  Area  that 
guaranteed  local currency  convertibility  into  pounds. 
Explicit  and  implicit  British  subsidies  to  the  emerg- 
ing nations  were  sufficient  to offset  their  desires  for 
independent  monetary  policies.  In  1966,  Kenya, 
Uganda,  and  Tanzania  (the  merger  of Tanganyika 
and Zanzibar)  each  adopted  its own  local shilling,  but 
all  three  remained  legal  tender  across  the  region 
(Cowitt/1989/p99),  and  all remained  convertible  into 
pounds.  Depreciation  of the  pound  in the  late  1960s 
and  early  1970s  led  to  the  dismantling  of the  Ster- 
ling  Area  in  1972.  Without  the  Sterling  Area  con- 
straints  on national  monetary  policies,  the  three  East 
African  national  monetary  authorities  were  free  to 
pursue  increasingly  independent  policies.  In  1977, 
the  East  African  Currency  Area  ended  as  each 
country  pursued  a different  rate  of inflation  and  the 
values  of  the  currencies  diverged. 
Monetary  Unions  That  Endure 
Zollverein  (German  Customs  Unionk3  De- 
spite  efforts  at  political  unification,  in  18 15  the 
German  Federation  was  composed  of  39  separate 
independent  states,  each  with  its own  standards  for 
coinage  (some  gold,  some  silver)  and for weights  and 
measures.  Many  coins  were  debased,  and there  were 
paper  moneys,  though  none  was  legal  tender.  The 
Congress  of Vienna  in  18 15 removed  restrictions  on 
labor  mobility,  but  the  myriad  coins  made  trade  and 
factor  movements  difficult  and  expensive. 
In  1834,  the  Zollverein  (Customs  Union)  was 
founded  with  the  intention  of reducing  cross-border 
transactions  costs.  In  1838,  most  of the  states  agreed 
on two monetary  standards  (the  Thaler  and Gulden), 
leaving  states  free  to pick  one  or the  other.  In  1847, 
the  central  bank  of the  Kingdom  of Prussia  (with two- 
thirds  of the  German  population  and  territory)  was 
given  primary  central  banking  responsibility  for most 
of  the  states  of  the  Federation.  In  1857,  the 
Zollverein  outlawed  gold  as  a  monetary  standard 
across  the  union,  effectively  putting-the  entire  union 
on  a  silver  standard. 
Prussia’s  stewardship  of the  monetary  union  held 
the  arrangement  together  through  the  time  of Ger- 
man  unification  in  1871.  The  Prussian  bank  then 
evolved  into  the  Reichsbank,  which  survived  until 
World  War II, and was supplanted  by the  institutions 
that  grew  into  today’s  Bundesbank.  Thus,  a vestige 
of this union  still survives  in the  deutsche  mark.  Two 
factors  seem  responsible  for  the  union’s  durability 
prior  to political  unification:  [ 1) Prussia  had  the  size, 
power,  and will to enforce  compliance  with the  agree- 
ment  on  the  smaller  states;  and  [Z] the  enactment 
of consistent  metallic  standards  depoliticized  the  cur- 
rency  by removing  the  princes’  ability to debase  their 
coinage  (Holtfrerichl19891~237). 
CFA  Franc  Zone:  The  CFA  (Communaute 
Financiere  Africaine)  Franc  Zone  encompasses  most 
of the  former  French  colonies  of West  and  Central 
Africa,  plus  one  former  Spanish  colony.  The  CFA 
Zone  is one  of the  most  successful  modern  monetary 
unions,  having  held  a  large  number  of  geographi- 
cally,  politically,  ethnically,  and  economically 
disparate  nations  together  for  over  30  years. 
3 Most  of  this  account  is  taken  from  Holtfrerich  (1989). 
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of a French  franc  since  1948)  circulates  across  the 
region  and  has  endured  the  departure  of  colonial 
administration  and  the  establishment  in  the  early 
1960s  of  the  modern  monetary  authorities.  There 
are  two  central  banks,  responsible  for  monetary 
policy  in two  different  groups  of countries.4  Member 
nations  of each  central  bank  pool  their  reserves  in 
the  French  Treasury.  There  are  few exchange  con- 
trols  on  converting  CFA  francs  into  French  francs, 
though  there  are  some  trade  and  capital  controls. 
Convertibility  is guaranteed  by an overdraft  privilege 
at  the  French  Treasury. 
The  CFA  Zone  has proven  successful  by a number 
of measures.  Its  inflation  has  been  much  lower  than 
in surrounding  countries,  largely  because  the  Zone’s 
rules  sharply  limit  the  amount  of credit  the  banking 
system  can  extend  to national  governments.  By the 
early  198Os,  however,  that  limit  was  being  cir- 
cumvented  by  lending  to  parastatals  (state-owned 
enterprises),  which  were  not  technically  government 
entities.  Recently,  the  viability  of the  Zone  has been 
called  into  question  because  of its $600  million  com- 
bined  overdraft  and fears that  the whole  system  might 
remain  permanently  in  deficit  @T/3-2  1-901~4). 
France  is crucial  to the  union,  still exercising  con- 
siderable  authority  over  policies  and  playing  a large 
role  in the  individual  countries’  economies  through 
direct  assistance  and  by subsidies  that  protect  these 
economies  from outside  competition.  Despite  Africa’s 
tendency  to reject  all things  colonial,  the  gains  from 
continued  association  with  the  French  apparently  are 
viewed  as  outweighing  the  negatives  of  granting 
France  power  over  the  region’s  monetary  policy. 
France  has been  able to maintain  its influence  in the 
area because  its economic  size (relative  to that  of the 
Zone)  makes  it the  dominant  partner.  The  total CFA 
franc  money  supply  is  less  than  3  percent  of  the 
French  money  supply. 
Belgium/Luxembourg:  Belgium  and  Luxem- 
bourg  maintain  separate  currencies  (Belgian  francs 
and  Luxembourg  francs),  linked  at  par  and  legal 
4 The  West  African  Currency  Union  (Banque  Centrale  des  Etats 
de  I’Afrique  de  I’Ouest)  covers  roughly  the  same  area  as  the 
former  French  West  Africa.  It  includes  Benin,  Togo,  Cste 
d’Ivoire,  Senegal,  Mali,  Niger,  and  Burkina  Faso.  The  Central 
African  Currency  Union  (Banque  des  Etats  de PAfrique Centrale) 
annroximatelv  covers  what  was  French  Eauatorial  Africa  and 
Cameroon,  phrs  Equatorial  Guinea,  a former  Spanish  colony. 
Members  include  the  Central  African  Reoublic.  the  Coneo. 
Cameroon,  Gabon,  Chad,  and  Equatorial  Guinea.  fid 
Comoros,  a republic  in  the  Indian  Ocean,  is part  of a broader 
Franc  Zone,  but  has  its  own  currency,  the  Comoros  Franc. 
tender  in  both  countries  (Cowitt/1989/pp56  l-67; 
Pick/  197 l/p3  11).  Monetary  policy  is  effectively 
under  the  control  of  Belgian  monetary  authorities, 
though  a joint  agency  manages  exchange  regulations. 
Switzerland/Liechtenstein:  The  Swiss  franc 
is  the  currency  for  both  countries  (Cowitt/1989/- 
~~689-93;  Pickl19711p292).  Monetary  policy  for 
both  countries  is  managed  by  the  Swiss  National 
Bank. 
France/Monaco/Andorra:  Both  Monaco  and 
Andorra  (along with  French  colonies)  use the  French 
franc,  with  French  authorities  in  full  control  of 
monetary  policy  (Cowitt/  19891~593).  Andorra  also 
uses  the  Spanish  peseta. 
Italy/San MarinoNatican  City:  Vatican  City 
issues  its own  Vatican  lira at par  with  the  Italian  lira 
(Pick/1971/p590),  with  both  legal  tender  in  both 
countries.  San Marino  also uses  both  the  Italian  and 
Vatican  lire and  mints  some  coins  of its own.  Italian 
authorities  effectively  control  the  monetary  policies 
of  the  Vatican  and  San  Marino. 
U.S./Liberia:  In  1944,  the  Liberian  dollar  was 
pegged  to  the  U.S.  dollar  at  par.  In  fact,  U.S. 
banknotes  were  made  legal tender  and have remained 
the  country’s  only  circulating  paper  money,  with 
Liberian  coins  minted  for use  as small change.  In the 
early  198Os,  Liberia,  while  it had  no  currency  of its 
own  and  thus  no  printing  presses  to  run,  circum- 
vented  the  discipline  imposed  by its use  of the  U.S. 
dollar.  It  began  minting  large  quantities  of  S-dollar 
coins,  using  them  to  pay  the  military  and  the  civil 
service.  Since  Liberia  has  no exchange  controls,  the 
principal  result  was  in  line  with  Gresham’s  Law- 
the  Liberian  coins  drove  out  much  of the  supply  of 
U.S.  currency  in  the  country. 
U.S./Panama:  With  its  founding  in  1904, 
Panama  pegged  its currency,  the  balboa,  to the  U.S. 
dollar.  U.S.  currency  and  coins  are  legal tender  and 
constitute  the  bulk  of circulating  money.  The  Banco 
National  de  Panama  issues  balboas  but  is not  a cen- 
tral bank;  it maintains  no  control  over  the  country’s 




Nations  do not  surrender  the  privilege  of creating 
money  without  having  good  reason  to  do  so.  Fried- 
man  argued  that  floating  exchange  rates  (which  are 
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of inflation)  are the  exchange  rate  regime  most  com- 
patible  with  a  free  market  and  free  trade  (Fried- 
man/1982/pp67-69).  National  monetary  sovereignty 
is the  usual  regime  for reasons  of history  and politics, 
as  well  as  for  purely  economic  reasons. 
To  help  understand  why  European  countries  might 
join a monetary  union,  this section  examines  the gains 
which  might  accrue  to members  of a union.  This  sec- 
tion  includes  a discussion  of three  theories  of opti- 
mum  currency  areas-a  term  for  areas  which  some 
theory  holds  oaghf to  form  monetary  unions. 
Benefits of a Monetary  Union 
A group  of countries  may conclude  that  the benefits 
of monetary  union  outweigh  the  benefits  of monetary 
independence.  Benefits  of  a  union  include: 
Cheaper  cross-border  trade:  With  separate 
currencies,  every  international  transaction  entails 
calculating  an exchange  rate,  enduring  exchange  risk, 
and  changing  currency  one  for  another.  Under  a 
union,  such  costs  disappear. 
Wider  access to markets:  By  eliminating  the 
extra  costs  associated  with  cross-border  trades,  in- 
dustries  with  economies  of scale  may  be  able to pro- 
duce  at  efficiently  high  levels. 
Increased seigniorage: When  someone  accepts 
a  U.S.  dollar  created  by  the  U.S.  government,  he 
has effectively  lent the government  one dollar’s worth 
of resources  interest-free.  Subtracting  out printing  and 
administrative  costs  yields  the  profit  to  the  govern- 
ment  from  money  creation  or seigniorage. The  smaller 
the  economy  covered  by a currency,  the  less induce- 
ment  for foreigners  or locals to hold  deposits  and con- 
duct  business  in  that  currency.  For  a  firm  doing 
business  across  Europe,  the  dollar  in  1990  may  be 
a  more  attractive  transactions  medium  than  either 
the  French  franc  or  the  deutsche  mark,  simply 
because  the  dollar  has  wider  acceptance  across  a 
greater  number  of  markets.  Because  of  its  wider 
market  access,  though,  an ECU  in 1994 may be more 
attractive  to the  same  firm than  the  dollar.  If so, there 
would  be  an  inducement  to  switch  one’s  currency 
holdings  from  dollars  to ECUs,  and  Europe,  not  the 
U.S.,  would  get  the  seigniorage. 
Political divisiveness: EMU  proponents  argue 
that  separate  currencies  foster  economic  nationalism. 
A major motivation  for an EMU  is a widespread  belief 
that  a common  currency  will help  solidify  the  Con- 
tinent’s  political  bonds. 
Theories  of Optimum  Currency  Areas 
The  above  list  of advantages  of monetary  unions 
does  not  provide  a coherent,  manageable  theory  ex- 
plaining  which  areas  should  form  monetary  unions 
and which  areas  are likely to form  them.  Ideally,  one 
would  like  a simpler  theory  that  captured  all these 
factors.  Preferably,  the  theory  would  specify  a single 
variable  that  simultaneously  decreases  the advantages 
and  increases  the  disadvantages  of  monetary  inde- 
pendence.  In  fact,  there  are  at  least  three  major 
theories  of  optimllm ncrreng  areas,  each  positing  a 
different  principal  reason  monetary  unions  form.  The 
reasons  include: 
Factor  Mobility:  This  is  the  extent  to  which 
factors  of  production  (labor,  capital)  are  free  to 
move  across  borders  (Mundell/  1968/pp  177-86).  For 
example,  workers  can  move  freely  throughout  the 
United  States.  Suppose  the  demand  decreases  for 
Northern  products  and workers  to produce  them  and 
increases  for Southern  products  and workers.  Wages 
or  employment  would  fall in  the  North  and  rise  in 
the  South.  Workers  will  migrate  to  the  South  to 
benefit  from  higher  wages  or  employment.  In  the 
end,  wages  in the two regions  will equalize  once  more 
as  migration  makes  labor  scarce  in  the  North  and 
plentiful  in  the  South. 
Now,  suppose  it is the  demand  for Mexican  goods 
that  drops  relative  to those  of the  U.S.  If Mexico  can 
conduct  an  independent,  expansionary  monetary 
policy,  it may be able briefly to stimulate  its depressed 
economy  or at least  chosen  sectors  of the  economy. 
It can  print  money,  thus  taxing  holders  of currency 
to  redistribute  their  wealth  to  the  unemployed.  Or, 
it could  devalue  the  peso,  stimulating  the  economy 
(or parts  of the  economy)  by  simultaneously  making 
all  Mexican  goods  cheaper  to  U.S.  buyers.  The 
perceived  ability  (real or not)  to stabilize  an economy 
by  using  monetary  policy  is often  given  as a reason 
for maintaining  an independent  monetary  policy.  If, 
however,  labor  can  move  freely  across  borders,  then 
Mexico  has  no  more  need  for  monetary  independ- 
ence  than  does  Dinwiddie,  Virginia. 
Even  if monetary  policy  can  stimulate  real  activ- 
ity in a closed  economy,  capital  mobility  makes  such 
stimulation  impossible  in  an  open  economy.  Sup- 
pose  Mexico  is depressed  and the  U.S.  booming,  and 
interest  rates  are equal  in both  countries.  If Mexican 
authorities  use  monetary  policy  in  an  effort  to 
stimulate  domestic  production,  this  will  exert 
downward  pressure  on  Mexican  interest  rates.  If 
those  holding  capital  in Mexico  cannot  freely  move 
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have  some  stimulative  effects.  If, however,  there  is 
capital  mobility,  downward  pressure  on  Mexican 
interest  rates  will  only  drive  assets  abroad  without 
having  any stimulative  effects.  Similarly,  the  Federal 
Reserve  Bank of Chicago  cannot  stabilize Midwestern 
employment  by  lowering  interest  rates.  If  it  did, 
assets  would  flee  to  the  other  Districts  thus  instan- 
taneously  equalizing  interest  rates  again.  Thus,  the 
existence  of labor  and  capital  mobility  reduces  the 
attractiveness  of pursuing  an independent  monetary 
policy  (Mundell/  19681pp 177-79). 
Internal  vs. External Transactions: McKinnon 
(1963)  saw optimum  currency  areas  in a given  region 
as defined  not  by  factor  mobility,  but  rather  by  the 
ratio  of transactions  a&/&  the  individual  countries 
to  transactions  bemeen  the  countries.  An  appreci- 
ation  of the  mark  against  the  franc  will increase  the 
prices  the  French  pay  for  German  goods.  If France 
buys  so much  from  Germany  that  such  an exchange 
rate  move  will be  viewed  by  Frenchmen  as a rise  in 
their  own  price  level,  then,  by McKinnon’s  criterion, 
France  and  Germany  ought  to  form  a  monetary 
union.  On  the  other  hand,  if Mexico  buys  little from 
Malawi,  then  a rise of the  Malawi  kwacha  against  the 
Mexican  peso  will not  be  seen  by Mexicans  as a rise 
in the  price  level.  Thus,  by  McKinnon’s  reckoning, 
Mexico  and  Malawi  do  not  belong  in  the  same 
monetary  union  because  changes  in the pesolkwacha 
exchange  rate  will change  the  Mexican  or Malawian 
price  levels  imperceptibly  or  not  at  all. 
Political Cohesion:  Kindleberger  (1973/pp424- 
34)  saw  optimum  currency  areas  as  defined  by  a 
region’s  sense  of political  community.  Simply  put, 
if French  are French  first and Europeans  second,  and 
Germans  are  Germans  first  and  Europeans  second, 
then  they  ought  to have  separate  currencies.  If they 
are  Europeans  first  and  French  or Germans  second, 
they  ought  to  have  a  single  currency.  Throughout 
history,  he  notes,  almost  every  country  has  had  its 
own  currency  and none,  he  asserts,  has had  different 
currencies  for  different  regions  (though  one  could 
argue  with  this,  looking  at examples  like state-issued 
moneys  in  the  nineteenth-century  U.S.). 
III. 
STABILIZING  FACTORS  IN  AN EMU 
Theoretical  gains  from  a monetary  union  are only 
realized  if the  agreement  setting  up  the  union  can 
be  enforced  upon  the  members.  As  with  any  con- 
tract,  there  must  be  enforcement  mechanisms  built 
into  the  agreement  which  constrain  the  members’ 
actions  to serve  the  good  of the  group.  This  section 
seeks  to  identify  institutional  differences  between 
those  unions  which  failed  and  those  which  still  en- 
dure.  Then  we ask whether  such  conditions  exist  in 
today’s  Europe. 
Surrendering Monetary  Independence: 
Institutional Arrangements 
The  effects  of a European  Monetary  Union  on the 
U.S.  depend  crucially  on  whether  the  union  seems 
stable  or transient.  This  section  looks  at the  institu- 
tional  forms  a  union  can  take,  catalogued  by  the 
number  of currencies  circulating  within  the  union  and 
by  the  domain  of the  central  bank  or  banks.  This 
will help  in later sections  to identify the  specific forms 
that  seem  to encourage  stability,  based  on historical 
evidence.  First,  institutional  arrangements  can 
include: 
Unionwide Currency: The  ECU,  for instance, 
would  circulate  in  every  member  country; 
Separate Currencies:  Instead  of  adopting  an 
ECU,  a European  Monetary  Union  could  agree  that 
francs,  marks,  pounds,  etc.,  would  each  freely  cir- 
culate  in all union  countries  at fixed  exchange  rates. 
Second,  union  monetary  policy  can  be  set  by: 
One  Unionwide  Central  Bank:  This  supra- 
national  institution  would  set  policy  for all members; 
One National Central Bank: The  central  bank 
of one country  (say, Germany)  could by mutual  agree- 
ment  set  policy  for  all members; 
Multiple National Central Banks: Each  coun- 
try  would  have  its  own  central  bank,  required  to 
follow  a policy  consistent  with  union  agreements; 
Multiple Nonnational  Central Banks: Differ- 
ent  regions  of the  union  would  have  separate  cen- 
tral banks,  but  the  borders  of their  regions  would  not 
follow  national  boundaries,  as the  Federal  Reserve 
Districts  do  not  follow  U.S.  state  boundaries.  [See 
the  accompanying  piece,  “A  Yankee  Recipe  for  a 
EuroFed  Omelet,”  for a discussion  of this possibility.] 
Whichever  arrangement  is chosen,  in a successful, 
lasting  monetary  union  money  moves  with  little  or 
no  restriction,  and  people  must  be  indifferent  be- 
tween  any two banknote  portfolios  of equal value  and 
between  any  two  deposit  accounts  of  equal  value 
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divide  their  holdings  between  banknotes  and 
deposits).  Under  a union  subject  to periodic  exchange 
rate  realignments,  no  one  will be  indifferent  to  the 
national  makeup  of his currency  and deposits.  Under 
the  supposedly  fixed  exchange  rates  of the  Bretton 
Woods  arrangement  (which  had some  characteristics 
of a monetary  union),  people  cared  a great  deal about 
whether  their  pockets  were  filled  with  dollars  or 
pounds  because  the  possibility  of  a  devaluation  or 
revaluation  of, say, the pound  against the dollar meant 
big  gains  or  losses,  depending  on  which  currency 
gained  and  which  lost  and  where  the  holder  of cur- 
rencies  lived. 
Since  1978,  most  of  the  European  Community 
countries  have  been  members  of  the  European 
Monetary  System  (EMS),  an agreement  to limit  ex- 
change  rate  movements  and  to  harmonize  the 
member  nations’  economic  policies.  It has given  rise 
to  the  European  Currency  Unit  (ECU),  a common 
unit  of account.  The  EMS  has  had  some  success  in 
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bringing  rates  of inflation  closer  together.  However, 
the  EMS  is not  a monetary  union-no  one  pretends 
that  exchange  rates  will  not  change. 
Incentives for Monetary  Restraint 
Table  I  catalogues  the  monetary  unions  by  the 
two  criteria  (number  of currencies,  domain  of cen- 
tral  banks)  presented  in  the  above  discussion  of 
institutional  arrangements.  In  each  case,  monetary 
restraint  was  imposed  on  members  by  some  factor 
that  limited  political  authorities’  influence  over 
monetary  policy.  Such  restraint  was  provided  either 
by  a viable  metallic  standard  or  by  the  presence  of 
a single  authority  with  the  power  to impose  its will. 
In this  admittedly  limited  number  of cases,  multiple 
currencies  do not appear  to threaten  the  arrangement. 
The  Luxembourg  franc,  Vatican  lira, San Marino  lira, 
Liberian  dollar,  and  Panamanian  balboa  have  not 
been  overissued  to  the  point  of  threatening  the 
respective  union  (though  Liberia  has  recently 
pushed  its  arrangement  somewhat). 
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Sterling  Area 
Prussia* 






United  States* 
United  States* 
Restraining  Factor 
Failed  Because  of 
Growth  of  smaller  colonies 
Silver  depreciated,  limited 
bimetallism  continued 
Some  members  left  gold 
standard  during  WWI 
Subsidiary  coin  loophole 
Collapse  of  world  gold 
standard  during  WWI 
Subsidiary  coin  loophole 
Convertibility  broken  with 
Sterling  Area  collapse 
Notes: 
*  Economic  dominance  of  one  member  enabled  it  to  enforce  restraint 
a Evolved  into  today’s  deutsche  mark 
D Luxembourg  has  some  power  over  foreign  exchange  regulation. 
c San  Marina  issues  no  currency.  but  mints  its  otin  coins. 
d Liberia  and  Panama  theoretically  have  independent  currencies  (the  Liberian  dollar  and  the  Panamanian  balboa).  but  in  practice  only  mint  coins.  Liberia  has  in  recent  years 
minted  sufficient  coins  to threaten  its  arrangement  with  the  U.S.  dollar. 
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tween  three  and  five  countries  of similar  economic 
size.  In  each  case,  overissue  of money  was  initially 
restrained  by factors which  separated  the  money  from 
the  political  authorities.  In each  case,  the  depoliticiz- 
ing factor  disappeared,  leaving  the  individual  political 
jurisdictions  free to determine  their  own  money  sup- 
plies,  and  leaving  monetary  authorities  vulnerable  to 
political  pressures.  Members  preyed  on  their  part- 
ners  by  issuing  excessive  amounts  of money,  which 
union  members  were  forced  to  accept. 
These  observations  accord  with what  cartel  theory 
would  suggest.  A monetary  union  is a cartel  whose 
product  is money  instead  of oil or coffee or diamonds. 
Like  all cartels,  members  of a monetary  union  must 
restrict  output  or suffer  declining  joint  profits  (in this 
case,  seigniorage).  As with  other  cartels,  restricting 
production  depends  on  maintaining  an  agreement 
among  members  on  how  to  share  the  profits.  Over 
time,  cartels  generally  break  down  because  at some 
point,  members  allow  pursuit  of  individual  self- 
interests  to  override  pursuit  of the  cartel’s  common 
goals.  Salin  (1984/pp  196-2 14) describes  the  current 
European  Monetary  System  as  a cartel. 
The  exception  to this  rule  is the  cartel  which  has 
one  member  with  both  the  motive  and the  economic 
power  to  impose  the  agreement  on  all  the  other 
members.  OPEC  held together  because  Saudi Arabia, 
with  one  fourth  of world  production,  was willing and 
able to expand  and contract  its production  in response 
to  changing  world  demand  and  supply  conditions. 
Furthermore,  the  Saudis  enjoyed  sizable  international 
reserves,  out  of which  current  expenditures  could  be 
financed,  if  necessary.  When  other  members  of 
OPEC  violated  their  agreement  by  overproducing, 
the  Saudis  could  threaten  to  expand  their  produc- 
tion  to  punish  the  cartel,  and  this  threat  was 
credible.  Similarly,  France  has  economic  and 
noneconomic  reasons  for  wanting  the  CFA  Franc 
Zone  to  survive,  giving  it  the  ability  and  desire  to 
keep  the  system  operating,  and  the  member  coun- 
tries  and  the  multinational  central  banks  are  fully 
aware  of  France’s  special  position. 
One  of the  major  obstacles  in the  way of an EMU 
is  the  lack  of  a  dominant  member  to  serve  as  the 
union’s  enforcer.  Liechtenstein  completely  sur- 
rendered  its  monetary  policy  to  the  Swiss  National 
Bank.  The  German  Bundesbank  has been  suggested 
for  a  similar  role  in  a  European  Union.  Now,  the 
advent  of  a  German  Monetary  Union  should  give 
Germany  an even  larger  percentage  of the  Western 
European  economy.  While  it is the  largest  economic 
power  in the  region,  however,  it does  not  dominate 
Western  Europe,  since  its Gross  Domestic  Product 
is only  about  l/4  of the  total  Common  Market  GDP 
(perhaps  30%  or  more  if estimated  East  German 
GDP  is  added).  It  has  been  suggested  that  all  of 
Western  Europe  similarly assign Germany  power  over 
the  joint  money  stock;  this  seems  unlikely  due  to 
political  reasons. 
Other  Factors Encouraging 
Permanent Union 
As mentioned  above,  it is unlikely  that  any member 
of  a  European  Monetary  Union  will  emerge  as  a 
sufficiently  dominant  force  in the  union  to  enforce 
a  monetary  cartel.  Further,  it  seems  unlikely  that 
Western  Europe  would  give sole  power  of monetary 
policy  to  some  large  (but  not  dominant)  member, 
such  as Germany.  Without  such  a dominant  member, 
other  factors  would  have  to  emerge  to  solidify  the 
union. 
Some  proponents  of a European  Monetary  Union 
hope  to  model  their  system  on  the  U.S.  Federal 
Reserve,  with  national  central  banks  becoming  the 
equivalents  of Federal  Reserve  District  Banks,  which 
constitute  a sort of monetary  union.  Money  circulates 
unrestricted  throughout  the  U.S.,  and  nobody  cares 
whether  the  bills bear  the  seal of the  Richmond  Fed 
or the  Cleveland  Fed  or any  other  regional  Federal 
Reserve  Bank.  This  situation  suggests  asking  what 
steps  are required  to create  such  a system  in Europe, 
and  what  obstacles  could  prevent  Europe  from 
developing  as  cohesive  a  system  as  the  Federal 
Reserve. 
Emergence  of  Europe  as  a Political Com- 
munity:  The  more  Europeans  begin  to  think  of 
themselves  as Europeans  rather  than  Dutch,  Italians, 
Greeks,  etc.,  the  stronger  the  EMU  will  be.  The 
Common  Market’s  founders  dreamed  of  a  United 
States  of Europe.  Some  of Europe’s  current  leaders 
appear  to support  subordinating  nationalism  to con- 
tinental  interests.  The  willingness  of their  constitu- 
ents  to  go  along  is  less  certain.  There  are  many 
barriers  to overcoming  ancient  nationalistic  tenden- 
cies.  Linguistic,  religious,  political,  and  cultural 
differences  still  separate  the  nations  of  Europe. 
A  Common  European  Fiscal Policy:  It  has 
been  argued  that  one  reason  for  the  solidity  of the 
United  States  as  a currency  area  is the  size  of the 
federal  government  compared  with  state  and  local 
governments.  This  size makes  possible  fiscal transfers 
from  booming  regions  to  depressed  regions.  These 
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monetary  stabilization  of regional  economies.  Tower 
and Willett  (1976/p25)  write  that  independent  fiscal 
policies  within  a  currency  area  are  likely  to  be 
of  a  “beggar-my-neighbor”  character,  leading  to 
inefficiencies. 
The  fiscal  tools  of the  Common  Market  (eg,  the 
Common  Agricultural  Policy,  the  Customs  Union) 
are  small  but  have  grown  in  importance.  Still,  the 
present-day  Common  Market  has  limited  ability  to 
tap  the  wealth  of,  say,  Germany,  to  ameliorate 
economic  difficulties  in,  say,  Greece  or  Ireland. 
This  limitation  has been  cited  as an obstacle  to a suc- 
cessful  EMU  (Leigh-Pembertonl19891p6).  Ingram 
(1973/p@,  though,  recalls  that  the  federal  govern- 
ment  was  small  compared  with  the  states  until  the 
New  Deal.  An explicit  agreement  to transfer  spend- 
ing  powers  from  the  national  governments  to  the 
European  Community,  plus explicit  agreement  to use 
such  power  to  smooth  regional  disturbances,  would 
help  solidify  an  EMU  by  reducing  the  need  for 
regional  monetary  stabilization  policy.  Such  regional 
issues  might  be  important  if labor  migration  were 
judged  to  have  pecuniary  or  nonpecuniary  costs. 
Again,  the  problem  arises  that  such  agreements  often 
fail  during  downturns  affecting  the  whole  union. 
It  is  often  stated  that  a monetary  union  requires 
fiscal harmonization  or else divergent  national  policies 
will  strain  the  monetary  accord.  In  one  sense,  this 
claim is an overstatement.  The  monetary  union  really 
requires  e&v-  fiscal  harmonization  UT common 
knowledge  that  monetary  policy  cannot  later  be 
used  to  correct  a member’s  fiscal  policy  errors.  In 
other  words,  if the  central  bank  of a monetary  union 
is willing  to  bail  out  individual  nations  whose  obli- 
gations  cannot  be  met,  then  fiscal policies  will have 
to  be  harmonized.  If,  however,  each  nation  knows 
the  central  bank  will  not  subsidize  its  desire  to 
live  beyond  its  means,  then  that  will  by  itself 
“harmonize”  policies.  In  the  United  States,  for 
example,  overextended  states  and localities  have  had 
no  guarantee,  traditionally,  that  the  U.S.  Treasury 
(and,  indirectly,  the  Fed)  would  bail  them  out. 
Europe 1992:  The  U.S.  is a common  market  in 
the  sense  that  goods,  labor,  and  capital  circulate 
with  limited  interference.  The  Europe  1992  Project 
is aimed  at making  Western  Europe  a similarly united 
market,  rather  than  a collection  of national  markets 
with  numerous  barriers.  The  Project  aims  to  create 
a common  legal  framework,  common  product  stan- 
dards,  and  a free  flow  of  goods  and  factors  across 
borders.  If the  aims are achieved,  the  European  Com- 
munity  will  certainly  become  more  of an  optimum 
currency  area.  As  is true  with  the  political  unity  of 
the  continent,  though,  it remains  to be  seen  whether 
Europe  1992 will succeed.  The  legal traditions  of the 
countries  are  vastly  different.  Noneconomic  factors 
(eg,  fear  of terrorists  and  criminals)  may  reduce  the 
actual  mobility  across  borders.  Further,  it  remains 
to be  seen  whether  the  countries  of Europe  will give 
up  their  often  subtle  barriers  to  free  trade. 
Nonnational  Central Banks:  There  is strong 
pressure  in  Europe  to  retain  the  existing  central 
banks,  with  each  responsible  for  its  own  nation’s 
monetary  policy.  Allen  (1976/pll)  wrote  that  it 
would  be  difficult  to  persuade  these  institutions, 
each  with  a long  history  of independence  and power, 
to  simply  disappear.  Yet,  as  this  paper  has  shown, 
multiple  central  banks  encourage  the  dissolution  of 
a monetary  union.  A possible  compromise  between 
retaining  and abolishing  national  central  banks  would 
be to retain  the  national  banks,  but redefine  the boun- 
daries  over  which  they  have  authority.  This  idea  is 
pursued  in  the  accompanying  article  “A  Yankee 
Recipe  for  a  EuroFed  Omelet.” 
.IV. 
CONCLUSIONS: CANTHE  EMU  FLY? 
A  successful  monetary  union  requires  that  the 
countries  involved  gain  from  the  union  agreement, 
and  it requires  institutions  which  enforce  the  agree- 
ment  once  it  is  reached.  The  theoretical  motives 
behind  a  monetary  union  (factor  mobility,  cross- 
border  transactions  within  the  community,  political 
cohesion)  appear  to  be  increasing.  In  all successful 
historical  unions  examined,  monetary  policy  was  in 
the  hands  of a single  monetary  authority  or,  where 
there  were  several  central  banks  one  was  suffi- 
ciently  dominant  to impose  the  agreement  on  other 
members.  “Self-regulating”  standards  (eg,  metallic 
content  of money)  enforced  by  multiple  authorities 
did  work  for  a time  in  several  cases.  In  each  case, 
though,  financial  pressures  and  weakening  of  the 
self-regulating  mechanism  eventually  led  members 
to violate  their  union  agreements.  In each  of the  four 
failed  unions  examined,  members  destroyed  the 
union  by  overissuing  their  moneys. 
According  to the  criteria  set  forth  in the  optimum 
currency  area  literature,  Western  Europe’s  motives 
for  forming  a  monetary  union  are  increasing.  The 
factors  of production  are  increasingly  mobile  within 
the  community  as  controls  are  being  dropped  on 
16  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  JULY/AUGUST  1990 movements  of  humans  and  capital.  Transactions 
occurring  &ween  European  Community  members  are 
increasing,  compared  with  transactions  wholly  wit/zh 
individual  member  nations.  The  region’s  sense  of 
political community,  while  still sharply  limited,  never- 
theless  seems  to  be  rising  as  numerous  political 
leaders  preach  the virtues  of continental  over  national 
interests. 
However,  no  centralized  EMU  enforcement 
mechanism  appears  to be  on the  horizon.  The  ECU 
(or permanently  tied  separate  currencies),  being  fiat 
money,  will  not  even  have  a  temporarily  self- 
regulating  standard,  as  the  Latin  and  Scandinavian 
Unions  had  in  gold  and  silver.  Several  decades  of 
experience  with  exchange  rate  mechanisms  like  the 
current  European  Monetary  System’s  have  met  with 
only  limited  success  because  economic  pressures 
induce  individual  members  to pursue  domestic  self- 
interests  over  the  common  good.  To  be  sure,  infla- 
tion  rates  in the  EMS  have  converged  (and exchange 
rates  stabilized).  But  during  this  period,  Western 
Europe  has  experienced  no  extraordinary  strains, 
such  as  war  or  prolonged  recession.  Even  the 
moderate  economic  difficulties  of  the  1970s  were 
sufficient  to  ruin  several  earlier  arrangements.  A 
permanent  EMU  would  likely  require  either  a 
supranational  monetary  authority  (possibly  with some 
degree  of  decentralization)  or  the  delegation  of  all 
authority  to  the  German  Bundesbank. 
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